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STATE Of UTAH 
BETTY '.!. GARD0!ER. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WILL1&'1 JAMES GARDNER, III, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 19246 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce brought by Plaintiff-
Appellant, Betty X. Gardner, against Defendant-Respondent, 
William James Gardner, III. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Weber County, the Honorable 
Ronald 0. Hyde presiding, sitting without a jury, granted a 
Decree of Divorce to Plaintiff-Appellant, hereinafter referred 
to as the "Wife". Although Defendant-Respondent, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Husband", filed an Answer and Counterclaim 
,., t lte-se proceedings. he presented no grounds for divorce at 
the trial, although it was represented on his behalf that the 
case was "not all one-sided" (T. 168). 
The familv home, farm, and equipment were to be 
<ald and the funds received therefrom were divided equally 
between the parties. Additionallv Wife 
1980 Volkswagen, substantiallv all of the l1ol1seholJ furniturt 
and furnishings in the familv home. one-third of the proceeds 
of the contract for the sale of the old Ogden Clinic building 
one-half of a $4,310.00 certificate of deposit at E F 
Hutton, one-half of the proceeds from the sale of boats and 
other vehicles, one-half of the proceeds from the sale of 
horses and paraphernalia, and her ski equipment and personal 
effects. Husband was awarded a 1981 Subaru automobile, two-
thirds of the proceeds from the contract for the sale of the 
old Ogden Clinic building, one-half of the E. F. Hutton 
certificate of deposit, the household furniture and furnish-
ings in his apartment, one-half of the proceeds from the 
sale of the boats and other vehicles, his ski equipment and 
personal effects, and his medical and business assets, 
including his retirement funds. 
Wife was awarded $1,200.00 per month alimonv, to 
continue until Husband's retirement, at which time the 
alimony was to be reduced to $600.00 per month. The trial 
court stated its intent that the alimonv should be paid from 
income from Husband's medical practice until he retires. and 
from his retirement income after retirement, and should 
Husband predecease Wife so that alimonv terminates. Wife was 
to have a claim against Husband's estate in the sum of 
$50,000.00, with Husband to select the method of securing 
-2-
_ '":" :.c-·11c;n '..:1e zilternatives set forth in the Utah 
Dog 1~ • fJ 5 2 P 2 d 13 0 8 ( l 9 8 2 ) . 
The Court made no award of attorney's fees, in-
j1(ating that the funds Wife received from the contract on 
the old Ogden Clinic building. and her share of the E. F. 
Hutton money certificate would be available for her use as 
actornev's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Husband (Respondent) seeks an affirmation of the 
trial court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts does not set forth 
full? or accurately the evidence which has a bearing on the 
issues on appeal. 
The parties were married to each other on April 14, 
1950 (T 167) No children were born as issue of the mar-
riage, but the parties adopted two children, both of whom 
1re now adults (T 168). Each party filed a divorce com-
plaint against the other, and the two cases were consolidated 
•R l~) Husband is a general and vascular surgeon and was 
)' ··e3r3 of age at the time of the trial (T 469). Wife was 
J 
1 .ears of age at the time trial (T. 216). Neither of the 
aJopted children presently reside at home (T. 203), and 
ilwd1anJ is still the sole source of support for the 19-year 
old daughter to whom he gives in excess of $300.00 per month 
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plus tuition and books while she attends L:td11 :)l.Lte :jrt1•1e1 ". 
at Logan, Utah (T. 470) Husband intends to continue supportir 
said daughter through college (T 471). 
Although Husband did not present grounds for divorce 
he represented that the case is "not one-sided" (T. 168), 
and his complaints against Wife are set forth in his answers 
to interrogatories (R. 57-58) wherein he indicated 
that problems of communication arose, each developed different 
interests (he as President of the Utah Medical Association 
and she as a horse fancier), Wife withdrew physically from 
him, causing the marital relationship to deteriorate, and 
Wife informed Husband she planned to leave him as soon as 
their daughter finished college. 
Husband was a Senior in college at the time of the 
marriage (T. 170), being three months short of graduation 
(T. 495). 
Although Wife claims to have worked while Husband 
was in medical school and training, Husband also worked 
during this period, doing such things as waiting on tables, 
construction work cutting lines for a gas company, working 
as a mail carrier (T. 205 and 496), working for Campbell Sour 
Company (T. 205), participating for pay in R.O.T.C. (T 497). 
submitting to experiments in the Dermatology Department for 
pay while in medical school (T. 497). and donating blood 
for money as often as he was permitted (T. 497). His parents 
-4-
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,;.; t• r .ii" of '.1is tuition through medical school (T. 171 
;;:d .:+"S) Husband also received money from the G. I. Bill 
that assisted through graduate work (T. 495). 
Wife is in good health (T. 177) but states she 
does not want to go to work (T. 177) and that she wants to 
direct her attention solely to philanthropic activity with-
out producing any sort of income (T. 219). She is, however, 
capable of employment, having developed good secretarial 
skills as the secretary to a college president and as a very 
competent executive secretary to a hospital administrator 
(T. 207 and 208). 
Husband's health is generally good (T. 471), 
although he has recently had two separate operations in 
connection with the removal of a kidney stone, has had a 
number of injuries, including fractures of the leg and 
skull, has had an episode of high blood pressure, and has a 
non-toxic goiter for which he takes medication and which 
causes some concern because of the greater likelihood of 
malignancv (T. 472). 
f Ji luwing. 
The present assets of the parties include the 
(a) A six-bedroom home, with garages for 
four cars, a barn, and other outbuildings situated 
on approximately 21 acres of land near Huntsville, 
Utah (T. 154, 215-216) Also included are several 
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horses. rack and. :C.Jr:-71 L"SL~-;_:;T71.c::' 1:--,r'~-1~ . ..;L'l'. !l 
approximatel:1 $18.575 r)(] (1 ',7fir There is a 
mortgage on the real propert·: of S~0.803.00 (T 13~ 
with monthlv pavments of $229.00 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2). Several appraisals were made of 
the real estate reflecting net value between 
$246,000.00 and $280,000.00 (R 105) The court 
ordered that the home. farm, and equipment be sold 
and that the proceeds be divided equallv between 
the parties (R. 110). 
(b) Household furniture and furnishin~s in 
the family home which Husband testified are worth 
$25,000.00 and are insured for $53,000.00 (T. 485) 
and which Wife testified are worth $13,710.00 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 through page 5 thereof) 
This was awarded to Wife. 
(c) Household furniture in Husband's possessin~ 
which he testified has a value of $2,500.00, and 
which the court awarded to him (Defendant's 
Exhibit 13) . 
(d) A 1980 Volkswagon which ea~h of the 
parties valued at $4,500.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
and Defendant's Exhibit 13). This was awarded to 
wife. 
(e) A 1981 Subaru automobile which Husband 
-6-
·:al~e0 ~t So,OOU.00 but against which there is a 
debt owing to the OGDEN CLINIC PROFIT SHARING PLAN 
of $7,436 00 (T 245). This was awarded to 
Husband. 
(f) Boat, motors, canoe, and other motor 
vehicles which Wife testified have a value of 
$5,374.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) and which Husband 
testified have a value of $5,074.00 (Defendant's 
Exhibit 13). These were ordered sold and the 
proceeds divided equally between the parties. 
(g) A certificate of deposit at E. F. Hutton 
with a value of $4,610.00 (T. 519). This was 
awarded half to each of the parties. 
(h) Ski equipment owned by each party with a 
value of $300.00 each. Each was awarded his own. 
(i) Assets in connection with Husband's 
medical practice consist of the following: 
1. 100 shares of stock in the OGDEN 
CLINIC PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION which the 
Administrator of the Clinic and the CPA for 
the Clinic both testified have a total value 
of $100.00 (T. 254 and T. 407). The said 
professional corporation is made up of 24 
physicians (T. 254) and the only assets of 
the corporation are the accounts receivable 
-7-
and the bank acc·nunt 11 ,,re, i 
ties consist of rent. c=mrl1_;· ep-. ,rnd t•h"sj -ci ir, 
salaries. and the contrijutions made hv the 
corporation to the phvsicians' profit sharing 
plan (T. 406) The corporation has no other 
physical assets (T. 406). Both the Clinic 
administrator and the CPA for the Clinic also 
testified that other doctors have recentlv 
left the Clinic and have been entitled to 
take nothing with them other than the value 
of their stock of $100.00 (T. 258 and 407) 
Husband would be entitled to nothing more if 
he left the Clinic (T. 258-59 and 407) 
Wife's attorney conceded that "there is no 
argument with regard to the $100.00 stock 
that the doctor owns in the OGDEN CLINIC 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION (T. 438). 
2. OGDEN CLINIC INVESTMENT COMPANY. 
This is a general partnership made up of the 
same physicians that are shareholders in the 
OGDEN CLINIC PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION (T '>l 1 i1 
Its assets consist of the Clinic huilding, 
the land immediatelv under the building. the 
parking lot, and the medical equipment used 
by the phvsicians (T 410) Its liabilities 
-8 -
1,· ,1_ ·)f "!-'1e ciortgage on the building and 
real propertv and the notes owing for the 
purchase of equipment (T. 410). The net 
worth of Husband in this entity, as carried 
on its books, is a minus $11,304.00 (T. 261 
and 412 and Defendant's Exhibit 3). None of 
the partners has ever had a draw from this 
partnership and they have had to subsidize it 
several times in the past ten years (T. 416). 
There is a buy-out provision in the partner-
ship agreement which governs the amount each 
physician would receive should he withdraw 
from the partnership (T. 262) and under that 
provision, two doctors who recently left 
each received $3,726.26 for their interest 
(T. 263) and the CPA for the partnership 
testified that this was determined to be the 
value of each partner's interest shortly 
before the trial (T. 416 and Defendant's 
Exhibit 5). 
An interest in OLD POST ROAD 
DE\'ELOP~!E~lT COMPANY This is a partnership 
made up of part of the Ogden Clinic physicians 
and the former Clinic Administrator (T. 264). 
It owns commercial property adjacent to the 
-9-
Ogden Clinic bu11.ding lT ~04 1 
recent records of this entitv ~how the book 
value of Husband's equitv to be $441.00 
(Defendant's Administrator and the CPA for 
this entity testified that the market value 
of Husband's equitv is a maximum of $12,500.00 
(T. 267 and 425), but the said CPA testified 
that she would not buy anybody's interest in 
this investment due to the poor economic 
situation and the fact that if the tenant of 
the building (Carriage House Furniture Store) 
cannot make the rental of $7,500.00 per 
month, the individual partners are going to 
have to make a mortgage payment of that 
amount (T. 424). Since the trial, the tenant 
has, in fact, defaulted on its lease and the 
partners are having to make the monthly 
mortgage payment. 
4. A promissory note to Husband from 
the old OGDEN CLINIC BUILDING CORPORATION. 
This represents Husband's share of the building 
previously occupied by Ogden Clinic (T. 24b1 
The balance owing on said note is $16,325.00, 
with payments being made to Husband of $192.55 
per month, with interest at 12 per cent per 
-10-
c·e11c per annum (T. 246-247), The CPA for 
the Clinic testified that this note will be 
worth less than $16,000.00 if interest rates 
go up (T 419). Husband testified that he 
would be willing to sell this asset "in a 
flash" for $16, 000. 00 (T. 490), The trial 
court granted one-third of this note to Wife 
and two-thirds to Husband (R. 111). 
5. An interest in the OGDEN CLINIC 
PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLAN, also known 
as the OGDEN CLINIC RETIREMENT TRUST. The 
books of the trust reflect that as of 
December 31, 1981, Husband's share was 
$101,285.25 (T. 241 and 426), and that he 
has a loan against this account for the pur-
chase of an automobile, with a balance of 
$7,436.00 (T, 245 and 430). Husband must 
actually retire or terminate his employment 
in order to be entitled to anything under the 
plan (T. 268), and the normal retirement age 
anticipated by the plan is age 65, which is 
10 vears away for Husband (T. 268 and 269). 
Under the plan, the trustees have the option 
to direct that a retiring physician will be 
paid over a period of time, rather than in 
-11-
a lump sum (T. ~b:I anJ -+~ i 1 
the plan is non-income producing IT ~27 anJ 
447). Doctors who have retired or terminated 
have asked for their funds, but due to problems 
in the plan, have not been paid (T. 429). The 
Clinic Administrator testified that the 
recent market value of the assets of the plan 
are below what the carrving value is on the 
books (T. 271) and that the value of the plan 
has actually been depreciating (T. 2 72) . The 
CPA for the Ogden Clinic testified that in 
view of the fact that Husband will not be 
entitled to any of the funds until his retire-
ment in 10 years, and that at that time the 
trustees may elect to pay his share out over 
a period of many years, the present value of 
Husband's interest in the retirement trust is 
approximately $40,969.00 (T. 432). 
6. Additional retirement benefits from 
Ogden Clinic. The by-laws of the Clinic set 
out a formula which provides that upon retire-
ment, a physician is entitled to receive as 
additional retirement benefits a sum equiv-
alent to four months of the average salarv he 
received during his last two vears of emplo'rrnent 
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·.'1i:::h tice Clinic (T 392). This asset is 
highb speculative (T. 429 and 493), inasmuch 
as a phvsician is not entitled to receive it 
if he practices medicine within an area of 30 
miles of the Ogden Clinic (T. 393), and the 
asset is completely unfunded (T. 493 and 
434) . This asset is even more speculative 
because of legal complications wherein the 
by-laws of the Clinic regarding this asset 
conflict with the by-laws of the PENSION AND 
PROFIT SHARING PLAN, and there are attempts 
to resolve this being made by attorneys for 
the Clinic and Retirement Trust (T. 435). 
Nothing has ever been paid out under this 
provision to any physicians who have retired 
or terminated their employment with the Ogden 
Clinic (T. 436). Husband has placed no value 
on this item because of its speculative 
nature (T. 438). 
The trial court concluded that the medical assets 
and retirement of Husband are basically futuristic and will 
i1a"e to be utilized at retirement (R. 97-98 and R. 105). 
These assets were awarded to Husband, with the exception 
that Wife was awarded one-third of the account from the sale of 
-13-
the old Ogden Clinic building (R lllJ 
Husband's 1981 income ·,vas S70,728 111) rT .+rl8l ••r 
an average of $5,894.00 per month, and the estimate of his 
CPA that his 1982 income would probablv be between $70,000.00 
to $80,000.00 (T. 409) was based upon the fact that two 
doctors had recently left the Clinic, leaving approximatelv 
$200,000.00 in accounts receivable to be disbursed to the 
remaining doctors, which would account for as much as a 
$10,000.00 increase in each of their salaries for the vear 
1982, but this would be a one-time increase (T. 409). 
Wife was awarded $1,200.00 per month alimony to 
continue until Husband's retirement, at which time it was 
reduced to $600.00 per month, with it being the intent of 
the trial court that the alimony should be paid from the 
income from defendant's medical practice until he retires 
and from retirement income after retirement, and should 
Husband predecease Wife so that alimony terminates, Wife 
should have a claim a8ainst Husband's estate in the sum of 
$50,000.00, with that claim being secured bv Husband through 
the alternatives set forth in the Utah case of Dogu v. Dogu, 
652 P2d 1308, as would best serve Husband's tax position 
(R. 112), 
-14-
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION ALL 
PERn;;nn CIRCUMSTAclCES AND MADE AN EQUITABLE 
DIVISION OF THE XARITAL ESTATE 
In the Utah case of Turner v. Turner, 649 P2d 6 
11982). this court stated: 
"Although this Court may weigh the evidence 
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court in divorce actions, Hendricks v. Hendricks, 
91 Utah 553, 63 P2d 277 (1936), this Court will 
not do so lightly merely because its judgment may 
differ from that of the trial judge, MacDonald v. 
MacDonald, Supra. See Mccrary v. McCrary, Utah, 
599 P2d 1248 (1979). A trial court's apportion-
ment of marital property will not be disturbed 
unless it works such a manifest injustice or in-
equity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion 
Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 610 P2d 1380 (1980); Naylor v. 
Naylor, Utah, 563 P2d 184 (1977) . " 
The Wife has not established such a manifest injustice 
or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion in 
this case. The trial court correctly found that the ·~arties 
primarv asset is their home, farm and equipment in the valley" 
(R 97), and that "one thing that is evident is the assets of 
the parties cannot be divided so that the plaintiff can stay 
in the family home" (R. 97). This is reasonable in view of 
the fact that both of the children have now left home and 
::e 'd-vear old \Vife does not need, and cannot practically 
•~e and maintain, a six-bedroom home with garages for four 
vehicles, a barn, outbuildings, farm equipment, several 
horses which she does not ride, and 21 acres of land. The 
-15 -
their "primary asset" so that each hci~ substanlial assets 
with which to begin anew. Eased on \-iite's O\•m evidence. she 
leaves the marriage with assets in excess of $150,000.00 in 
value. Husband values those same assets at in excess of 
$180,000.00. 
It was appropriate for the trial court to order 
that wife be permitted to remain in the home until it is 
sold and make the mortgage payment of $229.00 per month, 
together with taxes and insurance from the $1,200.00 per 
month alimony she receives. The real property was, in fact, 
sold within a few months after the granting of the divorce, 
so that Wife was responsible for those expenses for only a 
short time. 
Wife brought no assets into the marriage, and with 
the exception of the medical assets and retirement benefits 
which will be discussed hereafter, she is leaving the marriage 
with over one-half of the marital assets. 
POINT II 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY AND DISPOSITION OF ~EDICAL 
ASSETS AND RETIREMENT FUNDS MADE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
This case is remarkably similar to the Utah case 
of Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P2d 1308 (1982), which case was tried 
by the same District Court Judge and bv the same attorneys 
handling this appeal. That case also involved a marriage of 
-16 -
·"' ·1 ii1r.iti.1n 12-+ :1ears) between a physician and his 
1n~mploved spouse, in which the trial court made an essentially 
e4n~l division of the parties' property, excluding the 
Husband's medical assets (a professional corporation) and 
his retirement funds of $86, 730.00, both of which were awarded 
to him. Dr. Dogu's income was $108,675.00 the year prior to 
the divorce and the trial court awarded alimony of $1,500.00 
per month, which was reduced to $750.00 per month at the 
time of the doctor's retirement. The alimony award of 
$1,200.00 per month in the present case, based upon Husband's 
income the year prior to the divorce of $70,728.00, which is 
to be reduced to $600.00 per month upon retirement, is fair 
and equitable when compared to the alimony award in the Dogu 
case. This is particularly true in view of the fact that 
wife in this case filed an affidavit in an order to show 
cause proceeding setting forth her total monthly living ex-
penses at $1,648.00 (T. 6) of which $125.00 was attributable 
to farm animal care and $100.00 to farm maintenance, both of 
which expenses no longer exist, and $300.00 which she claimed 
was attributable to child tuition and school expenses, all 
of which were at the time, and now are, being paid 
h · Husband (T 470). After deducting these expenses which 
are no longer applicable ($525.00) from Wife's stated needs 
of $1,648.00. her actual needs are $1,123.00 per month. 
Should she desire, she is free to supplement this income by 
-17-
obtaining employment. Considering her ~tall· ·'l 2•>uJ hc·.i!L:1 
and her prior experience as a competent executive secretarv, 
she should be able to do so without great difficultv. Such 
an option was recognized by this Court in the case of Warren 
v. Warren, 655 P2d 684, Utah (1982) where upon termination 
of a 27-year marriage, the Husband, with a $40,000.00 per 
year income, was ordered to pay $400.00 per month alimony 
for a period of four years when the alimony terminated. 
This Court pointed out, on page 688, that "plaintiff is free 
to supplement this income by accepting full-time or part-
time employment." With her substantial assets and $1,200.00 
per month alimony, Wife in the present case was treated far 
more equitably than was the wife in the Warren case. 
Wife's position in her appeal brief that Husband's 
alleged fault in this marriage should be a factor considered 
by the Court in setting alimony and determining distribution 
of property, is erroneous. In the case of Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P2d 326, Utah, (1980), this Court ruled that 
the trial court improperly considered marital misconduct in 
making the property division. On page 328, the Court stated 
"We have previously held that a trial court 
must consider many factors in making a propert·: 
settlement in the divorce proceeding, but the 
purpose of the settlement should not be to impose 
punishment on either party." (citing Read v. 
Read, Utah, 594 P2d 871 (1979). 
-18-
In l~e case of English v. English, Utah, 565 P2d 
+Wl !1977). this Court stated, at page 411: 
"The purpose of alimony is to provide support 
for the wife and not to inflice punitive damages 
on the husband. Alimony is not intended as a 
penalty against the husband nor a reward to the wife." 
The award of the medical assets and retirement bene-
fits to Husband was proper and was consistent with the Court's 
holding in the Dogu case (Supra). Wife proposed that these 
assets be awarded to Husband in her proposed division of assets 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 19), but she carried them at grossly over-
inflated values. Her accountant testified that in his opinion 
the value of Husband's interest in OLD POST ROAD DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY was $16, 777. 00 (T. 371), notwithstanding the testimony 
of the Clinic Administrator that the Clinic was at that very 
time undertaking the purchase of a partnership interest two-
fifths the size of Husband's for $5,000.00, making the value of 
Husband's interest $12,500.00 (T. 266). 
An even more gross error was made by Wife's account-
ant in valuing Husband's interest in OGDEN CLINIC INVES™ENT 
COMPANY at $34, 041. 00 (T. 373). He went on to state that 
under the partnership agreement Husband (wouldn't be able to 
'.et r-hat value today) (T 373). The fact is that there is a 
buv-out provision in the partnership agreement which clearly 
determines the value of a partner's interest (T. 262) and 
Lhe testimony of the Clinic's Administrator was that under 
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the formula, two doctors who had .\ ust recen! l 
Clinic were each paid $3,726.26 for their interest, clearlv 
establishing the market value of each partnership interest. 
Wife's accountant attempted to value the retire-
ment trust at $119,921.00 by interpolating an 18.4 per cent 
increase in the fund over the previous vear. His reasoning 
was: 
"Not knowing what the valuation is going 
to be at the end of December of this vear, I 
felt maybe the 18.4 per cent increase.mi~ht be 
fair in 1982." (T. 374) (emphasis added 
The testimony of the Clinic's CPA and its Administrator was 
much more realistic in pointing out that even the book value 
of Husband's interest in the retirement plan ($101, 285. 00) was 
not the present market value thereof in view of the fact that 
it is not payable for 10 years and even then, the trustees 
could extend the pay-out over several years after retirement 
(T. 269 and T. 432). Wife also failed to take into account 
that there is a debt of almost $8,000 00 against the retire-
ment fund for the purchase of Husband's automobile. A far 
more accurate figure of $40,969.00 was given by the CPA for 
the Clinic as the present value of Husband's interest in the 
retirement plan (T. 432). 
The supplementary retirement provision in the 
Clinic By-Laws has been previously discussed herein, and due 
to its speculative nature, legal complications involved 
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c 1', , ~i1, cJnJ c_,1c fact that none of the doctors who have 
,,rc:"iousl? left the Clinic were even paid under this provision, 
1 s dpprnpriately valued as zero, 
A final example of erroneous testimony by Wife's 
accountant was given regarding the value of the Ogden Clinic 
building note which has an unpaid balance of approximately 
?16,329,00, Wife's accountant placed a present market value 
on said note of $34,650.00 on the basis that that is the 
amount with interest that would be paid out on the note over 
its lifetime (T. 395). He finally admitted on cross-examination 
that neither he nor anyone else in their right mind would 
pav that price for it, however (T. 396). Obviously it is not 
worth more than its face amount, and not even that if interest 
rates go up, 
The value of the medical assets set forth in 
Defendant's Exhibit 18 of $73,874.00 was established by the 
testimony of the CPA for the Ogden Clinic and the Clinic's 
Administrator and are far more realistic than the value of 
$231, 942. 00 placed by Wife's accountant on the same assets. 
The trial court was correct in finding that the medical 
assets and retirement are "futuristic" in nature and will be 
cl i l i zed at retirement, This was similar to the situation 
in the Dogu case (Supra) wherein a fixed amount was in the 
retirement fund, which would be available for use by the 
HusbanJ in paying the alimony after retirement. The concern 
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provision for the protection of Lhe wife in the event the 
husband died, thereby terminating the alimonv The court 
stated, however, at page 1310 as follows 
"If the decree had been drawn so that this marital 
asset [his retirement funds] would assure pavment 
of alimony in all events, it would be well with-
in the bounds of discretion on the facts of this 
case. 11 
The same trial judge was keenly aware of such a potential 
deficiency in the present case and corrected it bv providing 
that in the event of Husband's death, Wife will have a claim 
against his estate in the sum of $50,000.00. This will be 
payable to Wife whether Husband dies before or after retire-
ment and Husband may select the method of securing this 
claim through the alternatives set forth in the Dogu case. 
The holding of the case of Woodward v. Woodward. 
Utah, 565 P2d 431 (1982) cited by Wife is not applicable in 
this case. That case contemplated a regular and consistent 
setting aside of a certain amount of each of Husband's 
monthly paychecks for retirement, and therefore lends itself 
to the application of a formula based upon the number of 
years husband was married to wife accruing retirement bene-
fits in relation to the total number of years husband would 
have accrued such benefits by the time he actuallv retires. 
Such a formula is not appropriate in the present case where 
the amount going into the retirement fund in anv given vear 
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:r ~1~ '.:'.a:c · ::.1ctor". including the success of the 
· -~-~ cind its need to use income for other expenses 
The decision of the trial court to reduce the 
cilimonv to $600 00 per month at the time of retirement was 
cippropriate and based upon his sound reasoning that by the 
'ime of retirement the home should be sold (which has al-
readv occurred) and the Wife should have liquid assets; 
Hubband's income will materially decrease; and Wife will 
also receive social security benefits (R. 99), 
POINT III 
AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ASSETS DOES 
NOT REQUIRE AN AWARD TO WIFE OF HUSBAND'S 
PROSPECTIVE EARNINGS. 
Although in the trial of this case, Wife made no 
claim to, nor presented any evidence in support of, an award 
of the prospective earnings of Husband, her Point II now makes 
such a claim. She now contends, as an apparent afterthought, 
that she has a property interest in the medical degree and 
~usiness of the doctor which gives her a claim to his prospec-
tive earnings 
It should first be pointed out that the majority 
.1se' considering the question of whether the professional 
~e~ree constitutes marital property, involve marriages of 
short duration where the wife works to put a husband through 
o c lwu l and short 1 v aft er graduation, before the degree has 
~enerated anv improvement in their standard of living, the 
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the professional degree Had the monies earned bv the ~ife 
been used for the acquisition of phvsical assets, rather than 
invested in the degree, there would, of course. have been 
assets to be divided. 
The present case is quite different, however, in 
that the medical degree which was acquired with considerable 
toil and sacrifice by Husband and his parents, as well as the 
contribution of Wife, has produced a substantial harvest, 
the benefits of which Wife has enjoyed for some 25 years 
since she terminated employment in 1958. This affluence has 
made possible a very nice lifestyle (T. 213), a .<=>;reat deal of 
entertaining (T. 183), the owning of a "magnificant home" in 
east Ogden (T. 183). and the ultimate acquisition of a 
country estate in Ogden Valley (T. 215). She now leaves the 
marriage, sharing in a very sizeable estate, and receiving 
$1,200.00 per month alimony, which is far more than is 
awarded to the wife in most divorce situations. She has long 
since been more than compensated for her share of the contri-
bution to the acquisition of the medical degree. 
The cases cited by Wife do not support her claim to 
a property interest in the medical degree and business of 
Husband. The Colorado case of In Re ~arriage of Nichols, 
606 P2d 1314 (1979) cited bv Wife, holds that good will asso-
ciated with the private practice of a dentist mav be 
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.,, 1.Jered mdri tal oropert:/, subject to division where the 
altle thereof is established by the testimony of an expert. 
In the present case, Husband does not have his own private 
practice which could be sold or transferred to another, but 
rather he is a member of a professional clinic where he 
would be prohibited from transferring his practice. Upon 
withdrawing from the Clinic, he would not even be entitled 
to his accounts receivable, let alone any element of good 
will Wife has in no way attempted to·produce any evidence 
as to the value of any alleged good will. 
The Kansas case she cites of Williams v. Williams, 
548 P2d 794 (1976) has no applicability. It merely states 
certain criteria followed in Kansas in determining the 
question of alimony, and holds that under Kansas law the 
relative fault of the parties and the gravity of their 
transgressions will be considered in determining the extent 
of alimony. This is not the law in Utah, as evidenced by 
the Jesperson and English cases hereinbefore cited. 
The Oklahoma case of Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P2d 
n~3 (1977) cited bv Wife is easily distinguished from the 
That case involved a marriage of approximately 
,even vears and at the time of the divorce, the Husband was 
less than six months from graduation from medical school. 
Wife had been the principal breadwinner during the last five 
·:ears of the marriage and the total income she produced 
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during t:-ie mar"!:"iage '.-Jas sever3l Limes -:r1...,1'._1...·1 ·~1: 
produced by the husband. Recog;nizing chi;. the 1Jklcihom;i 
Court gave her a lump sum alimon-; award of Sl5.1)1JO.OO. 
payable in monthly installments. In the present case, the 
total income produced during the marriage by Husband is 
many, manv times greater than that produced during the same 
period by Wife. Furthermore, the divorce took place some 25 
years after the Wife last worked and after Husband had, 
through his own personal efforts and sacrifice, accumulated 
a very substantial estate in which Wife is now sharing The 
Wife in Colvert had no such estate in which to share. 
The Arizona case of In Re ~arriage of Goldstein, 
583 P2d 1343 (1978) cited by Wife does not support her 
present claim. That case merely held that the accounts 
receivable of the professional corporation owned bv the 
physician husband can appropriately be treated as a marital 
asset and need not be reduced bv an overhead allowance. 
This is contrarv to the holding in the Utah case of Dogu 
v. Dogu (Supra) wherein this Court found no abuse of discre-
tion in the trial court's determination that the accounts 
receivable of Dr. Dogu's professional corporation do not 
constitute a marital asset, but rather "represent defer-reJ 
income from which Respondent mav meet his ongoing alimonv 
and child support obligation to Appellant" (See page 1309 
of decision) 
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ihcc Lase uf Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 610 P2d 1380 
JSU) cited bv Wife held that it was not an abuse of dis-
cretion bv the trial court in awarding 4S per cent of the 
rn.Jrital estate to husband and SS per cent to wife (based on 
·.vife's valuations) where there had been a lengthy marriage 
and wife had worked while husband was in dental school, but 
one of the significant factors considered by the court in 
making such an award was that the wife had contributed 
$1S,OOO of her own funds to the acquisition of marital 
assets. 
Wife cites the Arizona case of Mori v. Mori, 603 
P~d 8S (1979) for the proposition that accounts receivable 
of the husband's professional corporation constituted 
marital assets. That issue has already been discussed pre-
viously. Of greater significance is the fact that in the 
Mori case, husband was earning $S,OOO.OO per month from his 
law practice and his wife was awarded $1,000.00 per month 
maintenance for one year. She did not dispute the amount of 
the maintenance, but argued that it was an abuse of discre-
t i·rn for the maintenance to be terminated in one year. The 
.\rizona Supreme Court agreed and held that where the wife 
.as 52 vears of age and had been married for almost 25 
··ears, with no previous employment record other than teach-
rng for six months in 1950 while her husband was in law 
,•chool, the $1, 000 00 per month maintenance order should 
-27-
continue for a period of three ~ears and •hen ler~inar~ 
comparison of the ~ori support order with the present case 
where Wife was awarded $1,200 00 per month alimonv until 
Husband's retirement and then $600.00 per month permanentl 
thereafter, shows the verv adequate nature of the alimonv 
award in the present case. 
Of particular significance regardin~ Wife's claim 
that she has a property interest in the medical degree of 
Husband, is the Colorado case of In Re Marriage of Anne P 
Graham, 574 P2d 75 (1978) where the wife argued that inasmuch 
as she contributed 70 per cent of the financial support 
which was used for family expenses and for her husband's 
education in obtaining a Bachelor of Science Degree in 
Engineering and Physics and a Masters Decree in Business 
Administration during their six-year marriage, she acquired 
a property right in his degree. The Colorado Supreme Court 
disagreed and stated as follows· 
"An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is 
simply not encompassed even bv the broad views of 
the concept of 'property.' It does not have an 
exchange value or any objective transferable value 
on an open market. It is personal to the holder. 
It terminates on death of the holder and is not 
inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, trans-
ferred, conveyed or pledged. A~ advanced degree 
is a cumulative product cf many vears of previous 
education, combined with diligence and hard work 
It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of 
money. It is simply an intellectual achievement 
that may potentially assist in the future acquis-
ition of propertv. In our view, it has none of 
the attributes of propertv in the usual sense of 
that term." 
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l'k 1:olorado Court went on to state: 
"Our interpretation is in accord with cases 
ln '"her jurisdictions We have ~een unable to 
find anv decision, even in community property 
states, which appears to have held that an ed-
ucation of one spouse is marital property to be 
divided on dissolution. This contention was 
dismissed in Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal.App.2d 786, 78 
Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct.App.), where it was held that a 
law degree is not a community property asset 
capable of division, partly because it 'cannot 
have monetary value placed upon it.' Similarly, 
it has been recently held that a person's earning 
capacity, even where enhanced by a law degree 
financed by the other spouse, 'should not be 
recognized as a separate, particular item of 
property.' Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 
2 5 7." 
POINT IV 
WIFE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AWARD OF ADDITIONAL 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In the RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL section of Wife's 
brief, she states she is seeking an award of attorney's 
fees, but said brief cites no evidence in support of the 
need for such fees, nor does it present any legal argument 
in support of such an award. 
Wife presented no evidence at trial to establish 
a need for attorney's fees and there was no testimony by 
lier attornev as to the number of hours that had been spent 
·lie •.ase, or anv indication of an hourly rate charged. 
en tl1e case of Warren v. Warren, (Supra) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated as follows: 
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"Plai~c:.:: ~)::ere.__: :-:.0 e ,-:_~:ere'- L 
shoT ..... 1 ct-:e :tatu!_'"e "~r 3r:-JC'"Jnt a:1 1r - t:" ~l:'.e.-, 
incurred in litigating the oresent ice on or 8nv 
need for court-ordered 1.ss is ta:-ice : ~1 t e :-ia·.rr:lent 
of such fees. Ctah law clearlv requires pre-
sentation of such evidence in order to support an 
attornev fee award. The trial court therefore 
properlj denied plaintiff's request for such 
fees." 
Although the trial court did not make an award of 
attornev's fees as such, he did consider that matter and 
made a specific finding that Wife could use her share of the 
E. F. Hutton money certificate and her share of the proceeds 
from the sale of the old Ogden Clinic building to assist in 
paying her attorney's fees (R. 111). He no doubt recognized 
that she was receiving a verv substantial property award in 
addition. 
(Supra): 
As stated in the case of Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 
"The decision to make such an award [referring to 
attorney's fees], together with the amount thereof, 
rests primarilv with the sound discretion of the 
trial court." 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding 
Wife's attorney's fees in this case. 
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The trial court was correct in finding that the 
principal asset of the parties was their country estate, con-
sisting of an expensive six-bedroom home, barn and outbuild-
ings. equipment, boats, horses and acreage. and that the only 
practical way to divide this asset was to direct that it be 
sold and the proceeds be divided equally between the parties. 
The court also correctly awarded the medical assets and re-
tirement to Husband, finding that they are futuristic in 
nature. The court correctly recognized that these assets are 
necessary for Husband to produce the income with which he pays 
the alimony of $1,200.00 per month until retirement, and that 
they, along with the retirement benefits to which Husband will 
be entitled should he survive his retirement date, will be 
utilized to pay the permanent alimony of $600.00 per month 
after retirement. The court appropriately made provision for 
the contingency that Husband might predecease Wife, by provid-
ing that she will be entitled to a claim against his estate 
of 350,000.00 in such event. 
It was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court 
_,., '.Jiling to grant Wife a property interest in Husband's 
medical degree and his prospective earnings, inasmuch as such 
request bv Wife was never made at the trial, and circumstances 
0f this case would not so warrant in any event. The refusal 
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of appropriate provision havin·'( he en TlLie ol :1cr···'' se, cs not 
an abuse of discretion bv the ~ourt 
The judgment and decree of the trial court should 
therefore be affirmed 
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